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ISSUE PRECLUSION: THE RETURN OF THE 
MULTIPLE CLAIMANT ANOMALY 
Aaron Gershonowitzt 
Offensive collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff estops a de-
fendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously 
litigated and lost. Although this doctrine is accepted by the 
Supreme Court, its application is limited to situations that would 
not cause unfairness to the defendant. Recently, the Supreme 
Court has exempted the government from the application of of-
fensive collateral estoppel for prevailing policy reasons. The au-
thor analyzes these decisions and their underlying policies and 
concludes that a private defendant can fashion an argument that 
the application of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel should 
not be allowed in the second case of a multiple claimant series, 
even against some private defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1957, Brainerd Currie published a famous article on mutuality of 
collateral estoppel. 1 The article discussed a hypothetical train crash in 
which fifty passengers are injured and fifty personal injury actions are 
filed against the railroad. Currie noted that if the railroad won the first 
twenty-five actions and lost the twenty-sixth, no court would consider 
estopping the railroad from litigating the subsequent cases. 2 Case 
twenty-six was clearly anomalous.3 He then reasoned that because the 
t B.A., University of Pittsburgh; J.D. George Washington University; 1983-84 Bige-
low Teaching Fellow, University of Chicago Law School; Mr. Gershonowitz is pres-
ently a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Lawyering Process 
and Moot Court programs at Western New England College School of Law. 
1. Currie, Mutuality a/Collateral Estoppel: Limits a/the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. 
L. REV. 281 (1957). The article was a response to the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia's decision in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). For further discussion of the Bernhard case, see infra 
notes 24-34 and accompanying text. 
2. Currie, supra note 1, at 286. It is clear that a victory by the defendant could not be 
used against any of the other plaintiffs because due process requires that each claim-
ant have his day in court. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. 
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. 
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811,122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299 (1982) (it is generally accepted that 
a party have a full and fair opportunity to litigate, fulfilling the elements of due 
process, before being estopped from relitigating the same issue with another party). 
3. Currie, supra note 1, at 286. Professor Currie stated that "such a judgment in such 
228 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
first case in a multiple claimant situation is just as likely to reach an 
anomalous result as the twenty-sixth or any other, offensive collateral 
estoppel should not be based on the first case in such a situation.4 
Currie's reasoning was rejected,5 and most courts, including the fed-
eral courts, do not hesitate to permit estoppel based on the first case of a 
multiple claimant series.6 Currie's famous example, however, is now ex-
periencing a revival. Since the example was used by the Supreme Court 
in Park/ane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore7 to illustrate the dangers of unbri-
dled use of offensive collateral estoppel, numerous decisions have dis-
cussed it. 8 More recently, the Court, in United States v. Mendoza,9 
a series must be an aberration." Id. at 289. Professor Currie noted that one com-
mentator had suggested that estoppel should be granted in cases 27-50 because the 
benefit of the experience from the first trial will help the defendant in subsequent 
trials, and should the defendant lose the first case, he ought not complain after 
having a fair opportunity to defend. Id. at 286 (citing Comment, Privity and Mutu-
ality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607 (1926»; see Seavey, Res 
Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties Nor Privies - Two California 
Cases, 57 HARV. L. REV. 98 (1943). Professor Currie felt, however, that such an 
outcome would be so grossly unfair to the defendant that the argument may not 
need an answer. Currie, supra note 1, at 287. 
4. Currie, supra note 1, at 289, ("[W]e have no warrant for assuming that the aberra-
tional judgment will not come as the first in the series. "). In a later work, Professor 
Currie appears to have tempered some of his reservations about the Bernhard doc-
trine. See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 
(1965). Some commentators read this article as a retraction of Currie's reservations. 
See, e.g., Note, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation: Handy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 15 CONN. L. REV. 247, 251 n.20 (1982). The better reading 
of Currie's second article, however, is to limit it to the context in which it was 
written. The article was part of a tribute to former California Chief Justice Roger 
Traynor, the author of the Bernhard decision. The basic thrust of the article was 
that because the Bernhard doctrine had been used quite cautiously, it had not 
worked great unfairness and thus evidenced Traynor's wisdom. Currie, supra note 
4, at 29; see also, Note, The Impact of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral 
Estoppel by a Non Party, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1018-19 (1967) (noting that 
Currie remained committed to the proposition that collateral estoppel should not be 
applied to work injustice). Thus, Currie's initial analysis remains very useful. 
5. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964); Teitelbaum Furs, 
Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 609, 375 P.2d 439, 441-42, 25 Cal. Rptr. 
559, 561-62 (1962) (discussing and rejecting Currie's reasoning that a nonparty to 
the first action should not be allowed to collaterally estop one who did not have the 
initiative in the first proceeding); Professor Currie discusses the rejection of his 
arguments in this and other cases in Currie, supra note 4, at 29-33. Some cases, 
however, have appeared to agree with Currie's reasoning. See, e.g., Nevarov v. 
Caldwell, 167 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958) (adopting Currie's reasoning 
and refusing to allow accident victims to avail themselves of prior plaintiffs judg-
ment). Indeed, one commentator has suggested that most of the exceptions to the 
Bernhard rule are the result of Currie's reasoning. Gunn, The Offensive Use of Col-
lateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases, 52 MISS. L.J. 765, 785 (1982). 
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 298-99 
(1982) (stating that "Bernhard . .. has now gained general acceptance" and citing 
cases from numerous jurisdictions); accord, 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §§ 4463-64 (1981). 
7. 439 U.S. 322, 329 n.ll (1979) (discussed infra at notes 115-24 and accompanying 
text). 
8. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 346 (5th Cir. 1982) 
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accepted an argument by the Solicitor General that sounded very much 
like Currie's. 10 This article argues that Park/ane!! and Mendoza!2 com-
bine to provide a strong basis for courts to adopt Professor Currie's mul-
tiple claimant anomaly reasoning. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion!3 is a judge-made doctrine 
concerning the effect of a final judgment on subsequent litigation.!4 Col-
lateral estoppel precludes parties or their privies!S from relitigating a 
(holding that offensive collateral estoppel based on Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. 
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), was im-
proper); Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1170 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing 
Currie's article to show that acceptance of offensive collateral estoppel by commen-
tators is far from unanimous); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 548 F. Supp. 66, 
70 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (using the citation of Currie's article in Parklane Hosiery Co., 
Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) to explain what Parklane meant to do about 
inconsistent judgments); Lindsay v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 799, 804 
(W.O. Wis. 1982) (reviewing Currie's reasoning and concluding that the dangers he 
feared were not present). 
9. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984). 
10. [d. The Solicitor General's argument can be seen at Petition for Certiorari at 19, 
United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984) (issue preclusion absent mutuality 
should not be invoked in a government case because of the potential unfairness that 
arises from the uniqueness of the government as a litigator, that is, the number of 
cases and jurisdictions in which the government litigates, and the types of issues, 
often constitutional, that the government litigates). See infra notes 163-65 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Solicitor General's argument). 
11. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
12. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984). 
13. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942) used the term "collateral estoppel," 
while the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) uses "issue preclu-
sion" for substantially the same doctrine. One of the reporters of the original Re-
statement, Professor Scott, stated that the term "collateral estoppel" was adopted 
"with some hesitation," because it is not precisely an estoppel. However, the report-
ers concluded that "[ilt seemed unwise, however, to invent a new terminology." 
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3 n.4 (1942). The 
Restatement (Second) noted that use of estoppel had caused some confusion because 
estoppel was being used in numerous similar circumstances. Thus, the drafters con-
cluded that "issue preclusion" would be clearer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS introduction at 5-6 (1982). Also, the Restatement (Second) noted that 
"issue preclusion" is broader in that it includes both direct and collateral estoppel. 
[d. § 27 comment b. 
14. See Scott, supra note 13, at 2-3. Professor Scott distinguished res judicata, the effect 
of a judgment on subsequent causes of action, from collateral estoppel, the effect of a 
judgment on issues actually litigated. Section 27 of the Restatement (Second) 
(1982) provides: "When an issue offact or law is actually litigated and determined 
by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, 
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether 
on the same or a different claim." 
15. Privity concerns the relationship between a party to a suit and a person not a party, 
but whose interest in the action was such that he will be bound by the final judg-
ment as if he were a party. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979) (citing 
Foltz v. Pullman Inc., 319 A.2d 38,41 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974»; see Parklane Ho-
siery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (citing IB J. MOORE, 
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fully litigated l6 issue of fact or law17 when a court has decided the issue 
and such decision was essential to the judgment. IS Due process requires 
that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 19 
Until recently, courts required mutuality of estoppel.2° This meant 
that unless both parties in a second action are bound by a prior judg-
ment, neither party may use the prior judgment for collateral estoppel 
purposes. From its inception, the mutuality doctrine was criticized by 
scholars21 and eroded by the creation of judicial exceptions.22 Neverthe-
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.405[1], at 622-24 (2d ed. 1983». It is a violation 
of due process to bind someone who was not a party or in privity with a party. 
Park/ane, 439 U.S. at 327 n.7; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,40 (1940). 
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS avoids the term "privity" in favor of 
the concept of representation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41-
42 (1982). The concept of privity is discussed in detail in IB J. MOORE, MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.411 (2d ed. 1983). 
16. See the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comments d - e (1982) for a 
discussion of the policies that require that the issue be actually litigated. The RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS provides that if a party could not obtain 
review of a judgment, that judgment should not serve as an estoppel. Id. § 28(1). 
See generally,lB J. MOORE, supra note 15 11 0.443[3] (2d ed. 1983) (unlitigated issues 
do not have conclusive effect for collateral estoppel). The importance of fully liti-
gating the issue is further explained in Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1977) 
(holding that offensive collateral estoppel is not appropriate against the government 
in criminal cases because the government often does not have the opportunity to 
fully litigate the issues). 
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comments doe (1982). The re-
porter's note, id. at 265, cites Buckeye Indus. Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 587 F.2d 
231 (5th Cir.) (permitting estoppel based on an issue of constitutional law), reh'g 
denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (1979). 
IS. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Comment h to this section 
explains that if a determination is not essential to the judgment, it is dicta and thus 
not appealable. In such circumstances, the interest in providing an opportunity for 
reconsideration outweighs the interests that favor estoppel. See also lB J. MOORE, 
supra note 15, at 11 0.443[5] (incidental determination of an issue in prior litigation 
does not foreclose reconsideration of the issue in a subsequent action where the issue 
is material). 
19. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 
(1971). The Court permitted nonmutual collateral estoppel to prevent the owner of 
a patent that had been adjudged invalid from enforcing the patent. The Court indi-
cated that as long as a party had one full and fair opportunity to litigate, due process 
would not prevent estoppel. Id. at 330; see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 2S(5)(c) (1982) (even though an issue is litigated and essential to a 
final judgment, relitigation of the issue is not precluded if there is a clear and con-
vincing need for a new determination of the issue because the party sought to be 
precluded did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate). 
20. Mutuality was not rejected in the federal courts until 1971. Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 321-30 (1971) (also discussing 
the history of the mutuality requirement); see also, lB J. MOORE, supra note 15, at 11 
0.441 [3.-2] (history of mutuality requirement). 
21. Jeremy Bentham said it was "destitute of any semblance of reason." 3 J. BENTHAM, 
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 579 (1827), reprinted in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed. IS43), as quoted in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323 (1970). The principle was also 
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less, many states still require mutuality of estoppel.23 
One of the earliest states to reject mutuality was California in Bern-
hard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association.24 BeNI-
hard was the second of two suits brought by Helen Bernhard regarding 
funds removed from a decedent's bank account. In the first suit, a con-
tested accounting, the funds were found to be a gift from the decedent to 
Mr. Cook. 2S In the second suit Mrs. Bernhard claimed that the bank had 
no authority to transfer the funds to Mr. Cook.26 The court granted the 
bank's motion to dismiss on the ground that Mr. Cook's right to the 
funds had been conclusively determined by the probate court.27 Justice 
Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, rejected mutuality28 and set 
down a new test for collateral estoppel: "Was the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in ques-
tion? Was there a final jUdgment on the merits? Was the party against 
whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication?"29 If each question can be answered affirmatively, collat-
attacked in Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who is Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 241, 
245-47 (1923); Comment, The Requirement of Mutuality in Estoppel by Judgment, 
29 ILL. L. REV. 93, 94 (1934); Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of 
Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607, 610 (1926); Note, 18 N.Y.U. L. REV. 565, 570-73 
(1941); Recent Cases, 15 U. CIN. L. REV. 349 (1941); Recent Decisions, 27 VA. L. 
REV. 955 (1941); cf Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 303 (1920); 
Note and Comment, 23 OR. L. REV. 273 (1944); Recent Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 
889 (1941). 
22. See 1B J. MOORE, supra note 15, at ~ 0.441[3.-2] for a thorough discussion of these 
exceptions (the exceptions include: if an injured third party sued the indemnitor 
first, and lost, and then sued the indemnitee and won, the latter had a cause of 
action against the former, and the indemnitee could plead the judgment in favor of 
the indemnitor to bar the suit against him by the third party; also applicable in 
master-servant or principal-agent situations and derivative liability actions). 
23. See, e.g., Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977) (refus-
ing offensive use of collateral estoppel); Lukacs v. Kluessner, 154 Ind. App. 452, 290 
N.E.2d 125 (1972) (mutuality required for res judicata); Daigneau v. National Cash 
Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (refusing to adopt identity of 
issues and full and fair opportunity to litigate test). 
24. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). 
25. [d. at 809-10, 122 P.2d at 893. Because of ill health the decedent authorized Mr. 
Cook to make drafts against her account. He used some of the money to meet 
expenses of the decedent, and deposited the rest in an account in his name. He 
qualified as executor and submitted an accounting that made no mention of this 
money. Helen Bernhard and others interested in the estate challenged the account-
ing and the court held that during her lifetime the decedent made a gift of the 
money to Mr. Cook. [d. 
26. [d. After Mr. Cook's discharge, Helen Bernhard was appointed administratrix and 
she sued the bank for the money. 
27. [d. 
28. See 1B J. MOORE, supra note 15, at ~ 0.441 [3.-2] (noting that had the bank been 
liable, it would have had an action against Mr. Cook, and therefore the case would 
have come within one of the traditional exceptions to the mutuality doctrine); see 
also supra note 19 (exceptions to mutuality doctrine). Instead, Justice Traynor 
"chose to extirpate the mutuality requirement and put it to the torch." Currie, 
supra note 4, at 26. 
29. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. 
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eral estoppel is appropriate.30 The Bernhard rule thus provides that no 
party should have more than one full and fair opportunity to litigate. 
The Bernhard test makes no reference to the position of the parties 
in the prior case.3\ Commentators and subsequent decisions, however, 
have distinguished offensive collateral estoppel - a plaintiff seeking to 
estop a defendant from litigating issues the defendant had previously liti-
gated and lost - from defensive collateral estoppel - a defendant seek-
ing to estop a plaintiff from litigating issues the plaintiff had previously 
litigated and 10st.32 Most courts that distinguish offensive and defensive 
collateral estoppel place greater limitations on offensive use. 33 Neverthe-
less Bernhard, a defensive collateral estoppel case, is the basis of both 
offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. 34 
Numerous courts followed Bernhard in rejecting mutuality.35 When 
the issue reached the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,36 the Court unanimously rejected 
mutuality.37 Many read Blonder-Tongue's rejection of mutuality to sup-
30. [d. Justice Traynor stated that only these three questions are pertinent in determin-
ing whether to permit collateral estoppel. 
31. The only issue in Bernhard was whether the plaintiff was a party in privity with a 
party to the prior suit. [d. The position of the party did not seem to be relevant. 
32. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979); see also Currie, supra 
note 1; Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1457 (1968). Both Currie and Semmel were cited by the Parklane Court to 
explain the offensive/defensive distinction. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329 n.ll. Both 
Currie and Semmel discuss the distinction and conclude that it is not as important 
as who had the initiative in the prior suit. Thus, if the party against whom estoppel 
is asserted offensively was plaintiff in the prior case, it would be much different from 
offensive use against a defendant in the prior suit. Currie, supra note 1, at 291-94; 
Semmel, supra, at 1466-67. 
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299-300 (1982) 
(while there is no intrinsic difference between offensive and defensive use of collat-
eral estoppel, some courts require a stronger showing that prior opportunity to liti-
gate was adequate before allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel); see, e.g., 
Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978); Speaker Sortation Sys. v. 
United States Postal Serv., 568 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1978); Vanguard Recording Soc'y, 
Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 410, 100 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972). The 
Parklane Court explained that offensive use does not promote judicial economy as 
well as does defensive use, and that offensive use may be unfair to a defendant. 
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979). 
34. See, e.g., Davidson v. Lonoke Prod. Credit Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 
1982) (defensive use); Arkla Exploration Co. v. Watt, 548 F. Supp. 466, 474 (W.O. 
Ark. 1982) (since Bernhard, many jurisdictions permit defensive use of collateral 
estoppel by a nonparty to first litigation). 
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299 (1982) 
(citing Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973); 
James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 940 (1971); Brown v. R.D. Werner Co., 428 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1970); 
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); 
Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 
(1950)); see also IB J. MOORE, supra note 15, at ~ 0.441[3.-2] (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1980)). 
36. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
37. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. He gave a thorough analysis of 
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port both offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. 38 Others, however, 
reasoned that Blonder-Tongue was a defensive case and should be limited 
to that situation.39 The Supreme Court resolved this question in Park-
lane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore,4{) which squarely addressed the issue of 
whether to permit nonmutual offensive use of collateral estoppel in the 
federal courts.41 
Parklane was the second of two suits against Parklane Hosiery Co. 
concerning the same allegedly misleading proxy statement. In the first 
case, an equitable action brought by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, a district court held that the proxy statement was materially 
misleading.42 Subsequently, the stockholders brought a class action suit 
for damages and for rescission of a merger contract. The district court 
refused to apply offensive collateral estoppel to preclude Parklane from 
relitigating issues previously decided against it,43 but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the prior suit had 
conclusively determined that the proxy was materially misleading.44 The 
Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the Second Circuit's use of offensive 
collateral estoppel.45 
The Parklane Court began with a brief discussion of Blonder-
the mutuality doctrine, including a discussion of Bernhard and other cases that re-
jected mutuality. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 
402 U.S. 313, 321-30 (1971). The Court reasoned that considerations of judicial 
economy combined with the criticisms of mutuality, such as Bentham's, supra note 
21, required rejection of mutuality in the federal courts. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 
at 328-29. 
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299 (1982). 
Justice White's emphasis on "full and fair opportunity to litigate" indicates that the 
position of the party is not nearly as important as the opportunity to litigate. See 
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29. 
39. See infra note 47; notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
40. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
41. Id. at 326. 
42. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 477 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). Herbert Somekh, the control-
ling shareholder of Parklane Hosiery Co., sought to have the company "go private." 
Proxy material was distributed and the SEC sued, claiming that the proxy statement 
should have disclosed that the underlying reason for the transaction was to solve 
some of Mr. Somekh's financial troubles. The SEC sought an amendment of the 
proxy statement and an injunction against further violations. 422 F. Supp. at 479-
80. 
43. The district court reasoned that "application of collateral estoppel would deny 
[Parklane Hosiery Co.] the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial." Parklane 
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 325. 
44. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), affd, 439 U.S. 322 
(1979). The court assumed that the rule of Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue would 
permit estoppel if the prior suit had been for damages and concentrated on the issue 
of whether applying estoppel based on an equitable action denied the right to a jury 
trial. /d. at 819. 
45. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 337. The Court granted certiorari because of an in-
tercircuit conflict. Id. at 325. The Second Circuit's position conflicted with the 
Fifth Circuit's position in Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1975) (previous 
injunction finding that defendants had violated securities law did not, under doc-
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Tongue and the rejection of mutuality.46 The Court noted that Blonder-
Tongue suggests that no party should be permitted more than one full 
and fair opportunity to litigate, a conclusion that would support offensive 
collateral estoppel. The Court concluded, however, that the Blonder-
Tongue holding should be limited to defensive use.47 
Next, the Court stated several reasons supporting the different treat-
ment of offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. Offensive collateral 
estoppel does not promote judicial economy as well as does defensive 
collateral estoppel. Defensive use of collateral estoppel prevents a plain-
tiff from relitigating issues merely by switching adversaries, and thus en-
courages a plaintiff to join all potential defendants. Conversely, because 
offensive use of collateral estoppel allows a plaintiff to rely on a previous 
judgment against a defendant, but does not bind the plaintiff to the de-
fendant's previous success, the plaintiff is encouraged to "wait and see" 
what happens.48 In addition, offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair 
to certain defendants, e.g., defendants who lacked the incentive to vigor-
ously defend a prior suit,49 defendants who have prevailed on that issue 
in other litigation,So and defendants whose defense was hindered by the 
trine of collateral estoppel, preclude relitigation of this issue in an action brought by 
strangers to the first action where defendant had a jury trial right). 
46. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326-29. The Court cited Blonder-Tongue's detailed 
description of the criticisms of mutuality and concluded that no reason could be 
found for the mutuality requirement. [d. at 327 n.8. 
47. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329. The Court noted that Blonder-Tongue had re-
jected mutuality "at ieast in cases where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of 
a patent after a federal court in a previous lawsuit has already declared it invalid." 
[d. at 327. The Court then noted that Blonder-Tongue also considered the question 
of "whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair 
opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue" and concluded that, although 
Blonder-Tongue indicated a negative answer to the above question, it had not di-
rectly confronted it. [d. at 328. Thus, the Court limited Blonder-Tongue to the 
defensive case. [d. at 329. 
48. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330. The Court cited Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. 
App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115 (1958), where although a driver and 
passsenger injured in the same accident sued together, each had a separate trial 
because the issue of contributory negligence existed as to the driver, but not the 
passenger. Thus no one was guilty of "wait and see," and estoppel was improper 
because the issues were different. The Court accurately cited Reardon v. Allen, 88 
N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1961). 
49. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330. The Court cited The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 
F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944), and Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 
F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965). Both citations are tenuous. The Evergreens was a case of 
mutual defensive collateral estoppel. The Evergreens, 141 F.2d at 928. The Berner 
holding appears to be premised on the idea that the defendant would have behaved 
differently in the first suit had he known about the possibility of estoppel. Berner, 
346 F.2d at 540-41. If that reasoning is what the Court was citing, it is difficult to 
see how this problem could arise now that the Supreme Court has made clear that 
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel is permissible. 
50. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330. If a defendant has previously prevailed on the 
same issue, it may be unfair to prevent him from relitigating it. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment f (1982) explains that one of the policies 
underlying collateral estoppel is enhancing confidence in the results of litigation. 
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procedural peculiarities of the prior forum. 51 
As further support for treating offensive and defensive collateral es-
toppel differently, the Court cited several law review articles, 52 including 
the Currie article mentioned above. 53 The primary thrust of these arti-
cles is against offensive use of collateral estoppel. Thus, many courts 
have interpreted Park/ane's citation of these articles as evidence that the 
Court did not really approve of offensive collateral estoppel. 54 
The Court concluded that trial courts should have "broad discre-
tion" to determine when offensive collateral estoppel should be applied. 55 
The Court advised trial courts that offensive collateral estoppel should 
not be permitted if: (1) the plaintiff could easily have joined in the previ-
ous action56 or (2) the application of offensive collateral estoppel would 
be unfair to a defendant. 57 
The Court then applied its rule. First it noted that the plaintiff 
This confidence, however, is not enhanced when inconsistent determinations have 
already been reached. 
51. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331. The Court cited inconvenient forum as an exam-
ple of differing procedural opportunities. Id. at n.15. It is interesting to note that 
the Court cited § 88(2) and comment i of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
(Tent. Draft No.2, 1975). That section stated the same rule for differing procedural 
opportunities. One example used by the Restatement, however, was existence of the 
right to a jury trial. This example was not carried over in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS as adopted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 
and comment i (1982). 
52. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329 n.11 states: 
Various commentators have expressed reservations regarding the applica-
tion of offensive collateral estoppel. Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits 
of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Semmel, Collateral 
Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 
(1968); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collat-
eral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967). Profes-
sor Currie later tempered his reservations. Currie, Civil Procedure: The 
Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965). 
53. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
54. See cases cited at supra note 8; see also infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
55. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331. The Court stated, "We have concluded that the 
preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to 
preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad dis-
cretion to determine when it should be applied." Id. 
56. Id; see supra note 48 and accompanying text. This portion of the Parklane decision 
is discussed in detail in Kempkes, Issue Preclusion: Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 
Revisited, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 111 (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 29(3) comment e (1982) (circumstances may suggest that the plaintiff 
is trying to invoke the previous favorable determination without incurring the risk 
of an unfavorable determination). 
57. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 29 (1982) lists similar circumstances that are likely to make application of 
offensive collateral estoppel unfair. In addition, § 29(8) provides that estoppel may 
be denied when "other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party 
be permitted to relitigate the issue." The lists are merely illustrative and the real 
question is whether any good reason exists to permit relitigation. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment j and reporter's note at 303 (1982). 
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could not have easily joined in the prior suit. 58 In addition, the Court 
noted that applying offensive collateral estoppel would not be unfair to 
the defendant because: (1) the defendant had every incentive to fully 
litigate the prior suit;59 (2) the decision relied upon was not inconsistent 
with any other determination of the same issue;60 and (3) the defendant 
would have no procedural opportunities in the second forum that were 
unavailable in the first. 61 The Court rejected the defendant's argument 
that the opportunity for a jury trial in the second suit provided a proce-
dural advantage in the second forum absent in the first. 62 Thus, the 
Court, applying nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, held that the de-
fendant was estopped from relitigating the question of whether the proxy 
statement was materially false and misleading.63 
Most commentators, including the American Law Institute in the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, interpret Park/ane as extending the 
Bernhard rule to the federal courts.64 Some courts, however, concluded 
58. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332. The Court noted that 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976 
& Supp. 1981) prohibits consolidation of a private action with a Securities & Ex-
change Commission action without consent of the SEC. Id. at n.l7; see also Securi-
ties & Exch. Comm'n v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, (2d Cir. 1972) 
(denial of attempt by private parties to intervene in SEC enforcement action because 
the added issues would complicate the case). 
59. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332. The Court stated that the seriousness of the 
allegations and the foreseeability of future suits created sufficient incentive to liti-
gate. The Court also noted that the length of the trial (four days) and the existence 
of suits by other plaintiffs supported its conclusion. Id. at n.18. But cf supra note 
49 and accompanyirig text (noting that the Court's prior discussion of incentive 
centered on the amount in controversy). 
60. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332; see supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
61. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332. The Court noted that petitioners in the present 
action would have been entitled to a jury trial had the SEC action never been 
brought, but concluded that presence or absence of a jury as fact finder was "basi-
cally neutral" compared to the necessity of litigating the first suit in an inconvenient 
forum. Id. at n.19. 
62. A major portion of the opinion is devoted to a determination that the petitioner's 
seventh amendment right to a jury trial had not been denied by the application of 
collateral estoppel. The Court relied upon Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 
U.S. 500 (1958) (declaratory judgment given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent 
action at law). Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 333-37. Justice Rehnquist argued that 
the Court has severely limited the right to a jury trial and reduced a "fundamental 
right" to a "mere neutral factor." Id. at 338 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
63. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 337. 
64. See, e.g., Lucas, The Direct and Collateral Effects of Alternative Holdings, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 701, 702 n.8 (1983); Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass 
Produced Product: A Proposal, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. I, 8 (1980). The RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS states a rule that is, in substance, the Bernhard 
rule, and favorably cites Parklane in a number of places. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 298-300 (1982). Moreover, the reporter's 
note cites Parklane for the proposition that "the distinct trend if not the clear 
weight of recent authority is that there is no intrinsic difference between offensive 
and defensive issue preclusion." Id. at 299-300; see also, Davidson v. Lonoke Prod. 
Credit Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[t]he doctrine developed in 
Bernhard, Blonder-Tongue and Parklane has now been incorporated into the Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments (1982)"). 
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that Parklane negatively viewed the use of offensive collateral estoppel, 
relying on the apparent hesitancy of the Court to permit its use and the 
citation of articles disapproving of its use.6S This second view of Park-
lane is the better; Parklane set forth a rule for offensive collateral estop-
pel that is very similar to the rules in Bernhard and the Restatement, but 
was intended to be applied more restrictively.66 Parklane set out to re-
strict the use of offensive collateral estoppel, and is thus a step toward 
Professor Currie's conclusions. 67 
III. RESTRICTING THE USE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Section 29 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Section 29) 
states a rule for non mutual issue preclusion that explains the Bernhard 
doctrine as it is currently applied in most states.68 The rule set forth in 
65. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 346 n.13 (5th Cir. 
1982) ("The injustice of applying collateral estoppel in cases involving mass torts is 
especially obvious. Thus, in Park/ane, the Court cited Professor Currie's 'familiar 
example' [of the 50 passengers injured in a train wreck)."); Bertrand v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 543 (D. Minn. 1982) ("The Supreme Court 
declined to either prohibit or wholeheartedly approve the offensive use of collateral 
estoppel."); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) ("Rather than wholeheartedly endorsing the doctrine of offensive collateral 
estoppel, the Supreme Court in Park/ane Hosiery cautioned that the policies of judi-
cial economy could be frustrated .... "). 
66. See infra notes 68-129 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra notes 1-4. 
68. Section 29 provides: 
Issue Preclusion in Subsequent Litigaton with Others 
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in 
accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so with an-
other person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording 
him an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The circumstances to which 
considerations should be given include those enumerated in § 28 and also 
whether: 
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible 
with an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions 
involved; 
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom preclu-
sion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determi-
nation of the issue that were not available in the first action and could 
likely result in the issue being differently determined; 
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfa-
vorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between 
himself and his present adversary; 
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with 
another determination of the same issue; 
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships 
among the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent 
action, or apparently was based on a compromise verdict or finding; 
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate deter-
mination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of 
another party thereto; 
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined 
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Section 29 closely resembles the Parklane rule: like Parklane, it requires 
that the prerequisites of mutual issue preclusion be met before consider-
ing nonmutuality,69 grants discretion to district judges,70 and takes into 
account potential unfairness to defendants and effects on judicial econ-
omy.7l However, the Restatement rule differs from the Parklane rule in 
a number of ways. Those differences demonstrate the Court's intent to 
restrict the offensive use of collateral estoppel. 
The primary difference between Parklane and the Restatement con-
cerns the effect of "a full and fair opportunity to litigate." The Restate-
ment, following Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue, provides that no party 
should have more than one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue.72 
Thus, under the Restatement, absent a showing of special circumstances, 
a defendant's full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action will 
be sufficient justification for the offensive use of collateral estoppel. 73 
would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration 
of the legal rule upon which it was based; 
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be 
permitted to relitigate the issue. 
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982) states that issue preclusion 
must first be appropriate under §§ 27 and 28, which state the Restatement's rule for 
mutual issue preclusion (a final determination of an issue of law or fact is conclusive 
in any subsequent litigation between the parties unless: the party against whom col-
lateral estoppel is invoked could not have obtained review of the determination; the 
issue is one of law and a new determination is warranted; procedural differences in 
the forums require relitigation; the burdens of proof have changed; public interest 
requires relitigation; or the lack of an incentive to fully and fairly litigate requires 
relitigation). See id. § 29, reporter's note at 300 (if a party is precluded from reliti-
gating an issue with a former adversary, the issue is whether circumstances exist 
which justify relitigating the issue with another party); see a/so, 18 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 
§ 4465 (1981) (discussing the limits of nonmutual issue preclusion). 
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982) lists factors that a district 
judge should consider: the incompatibility with the scheme of administering reme-
dies that may result from denying the opportunity to relitigate; the procedural ad-
vantages available to the defendant that were not present in the previous action; the 
ability of the plaintiff to join in the prior action; the inconsistency of the determina-
tion relied upon with other determinations of the same issue; the absence of unusual 
circumstances, such as a compromise verdict, that were present in the prior determi-
nation; the possibility of prejudice to another party from denying a chance to reliti-
gate; the foreclosure of an opportunity to reconsider a legal rule; and any other 
circumstances compelling relitigation. Section 29 is discussed in lB J. MOORE, 
supra note 15, at 1111 0.441[3.-2] & [3.-3). 
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (2), (4), (5), (8) (1982) list reasons 
why estoppel may be unfair: procedural advantages in the second forum; the possi-
bility of inconsistent determinations; unusual circumstances surrounding the first 
finding; and any other circumstances compelling relitigation. See lB J. MOORE, 
supra note 15, at 11 0.441[3.-4]. 
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982) provides that unless he 
lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate, a party precluded from litigating an 
issue with an opposing party is precluded from litigating that issue against another 
person. Comment b to this section suggests that a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate is generally sufficient for estoppel. 
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299 (1982) states 
that the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" rule has gained general acceptance. 
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Under Parklane, although a full and fair opportunity to litigate is neces-
sary, it is never a sufficient justification for offensive use of collateral es-
toppel. Parklane requires a full and fair opportunity to litigate plus a 
showing that other listed circumstances are not present. 74 
The Court made this difference clear in Parklane by refusing to fol-
low Blonder-Tongue.75 Blonder-Tongue followed Bernhard in conclud-
ing that it is unfair to permit a party more than one full and fair 
opportunity to litigate.76 When the Bernhard rule was applied offen-
sively, courts found that in certain circumstances estoppel would be un-
fair even if the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.77 
"Where the opportunity has been found, preclusion is applied .... " IB J. MOORE, 
supra note 15, at ~ 0.441[3.-3] mentions that the Restatement and Parklane both fail 
to define "full and fair opportunity." 
74. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. This rule is best illustrated by the 
Parklane Court's application of its own rule. The Court, in applying its rule, ex-
plained the absence of each of the circumstances that might prevent estoppel: the 
plaintiff could not have joined in the first action; the defendant had an incentive to 
fully and fairly litigate because of the seriousness of the first action and the foresee-
ability of private suits; the first determination was not inconsistent with any other 
determination; and the defendant had no procedural advantages in the second suit 
that were unavailable in the first action. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331-32. 
75. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. The Court stated: "The Blonder-
Tongue case involved defensive use of collateral estoppel . . . . The present case, 
by contrast, involves offensive use of collateral estoppel .... " Parklane Hosiery, 
439 U.S. at 329. 
76. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 323-29. The Court concluded that it is no longer "ten-
able to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolu-
tion of the same issue." Id. at 328-29; see Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327. 
77. Courts have found at least five reasons not to apply estoppel: 
(1) Failure to join in the prior action. The Parklane Court decried this "wait and 
see attitude." Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327; see Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J. 
Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967) (unfair to permit plaintiff, who knew of and could 
have joined prior suit, to benefit from estoppel); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 29 comment e (1982) (explaining why failure to join should prevent 
estoppel); see supra note 45 and accompanying text. This problem was perhaps first 
raised in Semmel, supra note 32. 
(2) Inconsistent determinations. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). A discussion of this rule can be found 
in Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980); see also Hardy 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (trial court erred in 
applying collateral estoppel to defendants where prior judgment granted, estoppel 
effect was inconsistent with previous judgments in similar suits). 
(3) Procedural differences. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(2) (1982). This rule, while noted with approval by 
Parklane and the Restatement, has rarely been applied. In GAF Corp. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1215-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court rejected several 
alleged "procedural differences" in such a way as to all but eliminate this from the 
list of considerations. Any procedural difference that does not prevent "a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate" should not prevent estoppel. 
(4) Lack of incentive to defend. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
(5) Issues not identical. See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 548 F. Supp. 
66, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (the court discussed Parklane and the potential for unfair-
ness, but concluded that the issues were not sufficiently identical to warrant estop-
pel); see also Weinberger, supra note 64, at 35-42 (arguing that whenever 
reasonableness is at issue the issues should not be deemed identical). 
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Thus, the rule was modified, as it appears in the Restatement, to permit a 
defendant to show the existence of special circumstances to avoid estop-
peP8 If Parklane intended to follow Bernhard, it would have followed 
Blonder-Tongue, granting an opportunity for the defendant to show spe-
cial circumstances that would preclude the offensive use of collateral es-
toppel. Instead, the Court stated that the Blonder-Tongue full and fair 
opportunity rule is not applicable to the offensive case and designed a 
new rule that where the plaintiff could easily have joined in the prior 
action and the application of collateral estoppel would be unfair to the 
defendant, the offensive use of collateral estoppel should be denied.79 
Thus, the Parklane Court's refusal to follow Blonder-Tongue indicates 
that the Parklane Court viewed a full and fair opportunity to litigate as 
less significant than does the Restatement. 
The Parklane Court illustrated its divergence from the Restatement 
rule when it applied its rule. Concluding that the defendant had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate, the Court proceeded to explain why no 
unfairness would result from the offensive application of collateral estop-
pel. 80 The Court explained the absence of each of the circumstances that 
might cause unfairness to the defendant.81 Under the Restatement, this 
reasoning is unnecessary because the defendant must show the existence 
of some circumstance requiring relitigation.82 Thus, by disposing of each 
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982) (a party is precluded unless 
circumstances justify relitigation). 
79. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329; see supra note 75 and accompanying text. It is 
interesting to note that in his amicus curiae brief in Parklane the Solicitor General 
argued for a broad reading of Blonder-Tongue. Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae at 12, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) ("This 
Court recognized in Blonder-Tongue that it is not tenable 'to afford a litigant more 
than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue'."). Peti-
tioners, however, argued that Blonder-Tongue was not controlling. Reply Brief for 
Petitioners at 5, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) ("In one 
decision, Blonder-Tongue . .. approved the application of the doctrine of estoppel 
in the absence of mutuality when asserted defensively to avoid redundant litigation 
of the validity of a patent. . . . No circumstances. . . are present as would war-
rant the extension of Blonder-Tongue . ... "). The Parklane Court used petition-
ers' language to distinguish Blonder-Tongue, then stated its own rule. Parklane 
Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327. 
80. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331-32; accord, 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ~ 4465 (1981); see Gunn, supra note 
5, at 773 (asserting that Parklane requires courts to examine the possibility of join-
der and the possibility of unfairness before applying estoppel); see also infra notes 
84-87 and accompanying text (demonstrating the practical effect of the difference 
between the rules in Parklane and the Restatement). 
81. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
82. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982) with Parklane Ho-
siery, 439 U.S. at 331. Section 29 puts forth a three part test for the offensive use of 
collateral estoppel: (I) presence of the conditions for mutual estoppel; (2) defend-
ant's full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action; and (3) defend-
ant's inabilty to show some circumstances that justify relitigation. Parklane, 
however, requires the plaintiff to show that the offensive use of collateral estoppel 
would not be unfair to the defendant. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331-32. 
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possible reason to relitigate, the Court showed that along with the oppo-
nent's previous full and fair opportunity to litigate, a party seeking estop-
pel must demonstrate the nonexistence of circumstances which might 
require relitigation.83 
The decision in Wetherill v. University of Chicag084 illustrates the 
practical effect of the difference between Parklane and the Restatement. 
In Wetherill, the plaintiffs alleged injury resulting from exposure to di-
ethylstilbestrol (DES) manufactured by the defendant, and sought estop-
pel based on a prior DES case the defendant had lost. 85 The court 
refused to permit estoppel because, inter alia,86 the plaintiffs had failed to 
show that the defendant would not suffer any unfairness.87 This decision 
follows the Parklane rule by requiring the plaintiff to show a lack of un-
fairness. The Restatement, however, requires the defendant to show un-
fairness and would not have refused estoppel for the reason used by the 
court. Thus, estoppel was refused in Wetherill for a reason sufficient 
under Parklane, but insufficient under the Restatement. 
A second significant difference between Parklane and the Restate-
ment concerns the differences between offensive and defensive collateral 
estoppel. 88 While Parklane controls the offensive use of collateral estop-
pel, it leaves Blonder-Tongue as the controlling rule for defensive use of 
collateral estoppel. 89 Parklane requires different rules for offensive and 
defensive use because offensive collateral estoppel does not promote judi-
cial economy as well as does defensive collateral estoppe190 and because 
offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair to defendants.91 Conversely, 
the Restatement provides one rule for both situations and states that "the 
clear weight of recent authority is to the effect that there is no intrinsic 
83. The difference between Parklane and the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
is best illustrated by what happens when a court senses some general, unarticulated 
unfairness. If the Restatement rule applied, estoppel would be granted because the 
defendant must show a good reason to relitigate. Under Parklane, however, where 
the plaintiff must show the absence of reasons to relitigate, estoppel would probably 
be an abuse of discretion. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 80, 
at § 4465. 
84. 548 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (denying estoppel in products liability case). The 
case purports to apply the Illinois law of collateral estoppel, not federal law, but it 
serves to illustrate how some judges have used Parklane. 
85. Plaintiff alleged that defendant manufacturer, Eli Lilly & Co., had litigated the same 
issues and lost in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 
(1979), affd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 436 N.E.2d 182 (1982). 
86. The court found three reasons to permit relitigation: (I) plaintiff failed to prove that 
the issues in Bichler were identical to the issues in the present case; (2) the existence 
of inconsistent judgments; and (3) plaintiff's failure to prove that there would be no 
unfairness to defendant. Wetherill, 548 F. Supp. at 69-70. 
87. The court, citing Parklane, clearly placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the 
lack of any unfairness. Wetherill, 548 F. Supp. at 70. 
88. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
89. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329. For a discussion of Blonder-Tongue, see supra notes 36-
39, 47 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
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difference between 'offensive' and 'defensive' issue preclusion."92 The use 
of different rules for offensive and defensive collateral estoppel, when 
viewed in light of the Court's citation of articles disapproving of offensive 
collateral estoppel,93 leads to the conclusion that Park/ane intended to 
restrict the use of offensive collateral estoppel. 
The difference in the treatment of offensive and defensive collateral 
estoppel should not be overstated. The Restatement recognizes that the 
potential for unfairness is greater in the offensive case, and therefore 
courts may require a stronger showing that the prior opportunity to liti-
gate was adequate.94 Park/ane permitted the use of offensive collateral 
estoppel despite a serious constitutional challenge.95 Thus, the difference 
between Park/ane and the Restatement is not that one is for and the 
other against the offensive use of collateral estoppel; the difference is 
much more subtle. Park/ane requires courts to be more sensitive to the 
differences between offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. Park/ane 
requires courts to use essentially the same rule as the Restatement,96 but 
to apply it in a way that demonstrates awareness of the potential unfair-
ness involved in offensive collateral estoppel. 
A number of recent decisions have noted Park/ane's hesitancy con-
cerning offensive collateral estoppel and concluded that Park/ane either 
did not approve of offensive collateral estoppel or said that offensive col-
lateral estoppel is unfair.97 These cases greatly overstate the differences 
between Park/ane and the Restatement. Nevertheless, the Park/ane deci-
sion contains at least three bases for the conclusion that the Court did 
not approve of offensive collateral estoppel,98 indicating that, while the 
Court was not opposed to offensive collateral estoppel, it intended that 
future courts be hesitant about using it. 
Courts often cite Park/ane's background discussion of offensive col-
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299 (1982). The 
Restatement does, however, note two differences between the rules for offensive and 
defensive collateral estoppel. First, a stronger showing that the prior opportunity to 
litigate was adequate may be required in the offensive case. Second, many of the 
circumstances listed that justify relitigation (e.g., impossibility of joining the first 
suit and inadequate procedural opportunities in the first forum) can only exist in the 
offensive case. 
93. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299-300 (1982). 
The cases cited by the reporter's note, Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th 
Cir. 1978) and Speaker Sortation Sys. v. United States Postal Serv., 568 F.2d 46 (7th 
Cir. 1978), do not discuss the relationship between offensive and defensive collateral 
estoppel. They do, however, apply offensive collateral estoppel based on Blonder-
Tongue. 
95. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 335-37 (discussing the jury trial issue and deciding 
that it is not grounds to permit relitigation). See also id. at 337 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the Court has eliminated a fundamental right for the sake of 
convenience). 
96. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331 n.16. The Court said: "This is essentially the 
approach of [the Restatement § 29]. ... " 
97. See supra notes 54 & 65. 
98. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. 
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lateral estoppel to show that the Court did not approve of it. 99 In its 
background discussion, the Court considered Bernhard and Blonder-
Tongue and outlined the virtues of nonmutual defensive collateral estop-
pel. 1OO The Court then discussed the likely negative impact of offensive 
collateral estoppel on judicial economy, and the potential for unfairness 
that may result. 10l Yet, in all of the background discussion, the Court 
did not make a positive statement about offensive collateral estoppel. Be-
cause the Court's only discussion of offensive collateral estoppel warns of 
its potential ill effects, however, many assume that the Court did not 
approve of it. 102 
The wording of the rule announced in Parklane might also suggest 
disapproval of offensive collateral estoppel. The Court did not explicitly 
permit offensive collateral estoppel. Instead, the Court stated that the 
preferable approach is "not to preclude the use of offensive collateral es-
toppel." 103 "Not to preclude" is a far cry from an endorsement of the 
doctrine. Moreover, that the "not to preclude" phrase was immediately 
preceded by the discussion of the probable ill effects of offensive collat-
eral estoppel could suggest that the Court permitted the use of offensive 
collateral estoppel without approving of the doctrine. 104 Thus, the courts 
that suggest that Parklane did not approve of offensive collateral estoppel 
demonstrate a sensitivity to the Court's choice of words and the organi-
zation of the decision. 
Courts also cite the law review articles used by the Parklane Court 
to support the offensive/defensive distinction to conclude that the Park-
lane Court did not unconditionally approve of offensive collateral estop-
pel. lOS The primary thrust of these articles is opposed to the use of 
offensive collateral estoppel. I06 They go well beyond the Court's recogni-
99. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
100. Park/ane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326-29. 
101. [d. at 330. 
102. See supra note 65. 
103. The Court stated: 
We have concluded that the preferable approach for dealing with these 
problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collat-
eral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when 
it should be applied. The general rule should be that in cases where a 
plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for 
the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offen-
sive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow 
the use of offensive collateral estoppel. 
Park/ane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331 (footnote omitted). 
104. But cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 298-99 
(1982) (offensive use of collateral estoppel is now accepted to the same extent as the 
rejection of mutuality). 
105. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. This is reasonable because both Currie 
and Semmel concluded that collateral estoppel should not be permitted against a 
party who lacked the initiative in the prior litigation. See supra note 32. 
106. See Currie, supra note 1. Professor Semmel argues that because it is not possible to 
determine whether a prior case involved "a full and fair opportunity to litigate," 
attempts to apply nonmutual collateral estoppel will result in a horrible mess. Sem-
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tion that offensive collateral estoppel might be unfair to some defendants 
and might not promote judicial economy by arguing that offensive collat-
eral estoppel should not be permitted because it is unfair to defendants 
and does not promote judicial economy.107 Some courts have cited these 
articles and their anti-offensive collateral estoppel bent as if Parkland ap-
proved of the articles. !Os That conclusion is not unreasonable in light of 
the apparently approving citations. 
None of the arguments, however, that Parklane is against offensive 
collateral estoppel is convincing. The argument based on the back-
ground discussion is unconvincing because it ignores what the Court ac-
tually did. The Court granted district courts broad discretion to allow 
the use of offensive collateral estoppel. 109 It is difficult to believe the 
Court would grant broad discretion to do something of which it disap-
proved. Moreover, in explaining its rule, the Court said it followed "es-
sentially the approach" of the Restatement. 110 The Restatement 
approves of offensive collateral estoppel to almost the same extent as it 
approves of defensive collateral estoppel. lll Thus, any argument that 
Parklane did not approve of offensive collateral estoppel ignores the 
Court's conclusion and assumes that the Court cited the Restatement 
without knowing what the Restatement said. 
The argument based on the wording of the rule is also difficult to 
reconcile with the Court's decision. That argument assumes that "not to 
preclude" means that the Court did not approve of offensive collateral 
estoppel, but merely recognized that there may be some situations in 
which there is no reason not to permit its use, and that district judges 
should be free to use offensive collateral estoppel in those situations. 112 
Yet, in Parklane, the Court was faced with a serious reason not to permit 
the offensive use of collateral estoppel - the defendant's claim of a right 
to jury trial. 113 If the argument based on the wording of the rule were 
sound, the Parklane Court would have relied on this reason and would 
have refused to apply offensive collateral estoppel. Thus, the argument 
fails because it emphasizes a nuance in the Court's wording over what 
the Court actually did. 
The law review citations provide the weakest basis for concluding 
that Parklane did not approve of offensive collateral estoppel because 
most of the points made in those articles are rejected by the Court's hold-
mel, supra note 32, at 1468-70. He concludes that amending the joinder rules is a 
much wiser approach to the multiple claimant situation than use of collateral estop-
pel. Id. at 1480-81. 
107. See Currie, supra note 1; Semmel, supra note 32, at 1466-68 (apparently adopting 
Currie's reasoning). 
108. See supra note 8. 
109. Park/ane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331. 
110. Id. at 331 n.16. 
Ill. See supra note 104. 
112. See supra note 103. 
113. Park/ane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 333 (allowing the offensive use of collateral estoppel 
prevented defendant from having a jury decide issues already decided in the prior 
equitable proceeding). 
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ing. 1I4 Nevertheless, because these articles are often cited 115 in decisions 
based on Parklane, a brief discussion of their reasoning will be helpful. 
In his Stanford Law Review article, Professor Currie expressed res-
ervations about the Bernhard doctrine. 1I6 His main concern was that 
judges with unrestrained discretion might use the doctrine to reach un-
fair cr anomalous results.117 To prevent this, he suggested two rules of 
thumb to serve as limitations on the Bernhard doctrine. First, because of 
the possibility of anomalous results, offensive collateral estoppel should 
not be used when the same incident produces a number of potential 
claimants who may sue separately. Second, because the party who takes 
the initiative always has some advantages, collateral estoppel should not 
be used against a party who lacked the initiative in the prior SUit. IIS 
Parklane implicitly rejected the second of these rules by permitting col-
lateral estoppel against a party who lacked the initiative in the prior 
suit. 119 It did not face the first because the second Parklane case was a 
class action and thus not a multiple claimant situation. 
Although the law review articles do not support the view that the 
Parklane Court opposed offensive collateral estoppel,120 it would be 
equally wrong to assume that the Court was not using them to make a 
statement about offensive collateral estoppel. Although the Court clearly 
did not cite the articles to agree with them, it clearly did not cite them to 
disagree completely with them.121 A closer look at these articles and the 
use made of them in Parklane will indicate that the Court may have cited 
them to distance itself from the Restatement's position. 
114. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra note 8. 
116. Currie, supra note 1, at 282-85; see also notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
117. Professor Currie stated: 
For immediate purposes it is sufficient to state the reservations as briefly as 
possible: to jettison the mutuality rule without some saving provision 
might lead to (1) anomalous results in multiple-claimant cases, such as 
those resulting from mass disasters, and (2) injustice in those cases in 
which, by reason of his opponent's astute employment of the initiative, the 
party against whom the former judgment is invoked did not. . . have, in a 
realistic sense, a full and fair opportunity to defend. 
Currie, supra note 4, at 27. 
118. Professor Currie stated his "rules of thumb" as follows: 
First, it should not be applied, and the plea should not be allowed, where 
the result would be to create an anomaly such as would occur in the rail-
road type of sitation, where the party against whom the plea is asserted 
faces more than two successive actions. Second, since the principle as-
sumes that the party against whom the plea is asserted has had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue effectively, the principle should not be 
applied, and the plea should not be allowed, where, by reason of his for-
mer adversary's possession of the initiative, he has not had such an 
opportunity. 
Currie, supra note 1, at 308. 
119. Parklane Hosiery Co. was defendant in both actions. 
120. See supra notes 105-07 and acompanying text. 
121. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329 n.ll, 330-31 nn.I4-15. The Court used exam-
ples from the articles to support its position. 
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The Parklane Court's first citation to these articles was in a footnote 
designed to support the proposition that offensive and defensive collat-
eral estoppel "should be treated differently."122 This proposition needed 
extra support because the Restatement says that the same rule should 
apply to both. 123 If the Court's sole purpose were to support that propo-
sition, however, why did it cite articles that discuss this distinction and 
conclude that other distinctions are more important124 when there are 
cases and commentators who see the offensive/defensive distinction as 
crucial?125 The reason is clear: These articles raise concerns about fair-
ness that the Court wanted to inject into the debate. Thus, the footnote 
clearly sets Parklane's position as different from that of the Restatement, 
but it does so by injecting different concerns into its rule, not by propos-
ing a different rule. 
The Parklane Court's second citation to Currie's article was in-
tended to support the proposition that "offensive collateral estoppel may 
also be unfair to a defendant if the judgment relied upon as a basis for the 
estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in 
favor of the defendants."126 Again, the Court's citation does not really 
support the proposition, and this highlights a subtle distinction between 
Parklane and the Restatement. The Court simply could have cited only 
the Restatement's rule, which says substantially the same thing. 127 In-
stead, the Court cited Currie's train wreck example, with a slight varia-
tion. Currie said that if defendant wins the first twenty-five suits and 
loses number twenty-six, no court would uphold use of estoppel against 
the defendant in the last twenty-four suitS.128 The Parklane Court 
changed this to say that Currie argued that estoppel should not be applied 
in the last twenty-four suits. 129 Currie and the Parklane Court agree that 
122. Id. at 329. 
123. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments clearly covers both the offensive and the 
defensive case. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note 
at 299-300 (1982) (stating that most agree that they should be treated the same). 
124. Currie, supra note 1, at 303, concluded that who had the initiative in the prior 
litigation is more important than whether nonmutual estoppel is being used offen-
sively or defensively. Semmel, supra note 32, at 1480, concluded that joinder of 
parties, not collateral estoppel, is the correct way to deal with the issue. 
125. See, e.g., Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977) (limit-
ing nonmutual estoppel to the defensive case); Albernaz v. City of Fall River, 346 
Mass. 36, 191 N.E.2d 771 (1963) (same); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: 
Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27, 75 (1964) (predicting that courts are much more likely 
to use estoppel defensively than offensively). 
126. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330 n.14. 
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(4) (1982) provides that estoppel 
may be improper if "[t]he determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsis-
tent with another determination of the same issue." But see Wetherill v. University 
of Chicago, 548 F. Supp. 66, 70 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (arguing that § 29(4) differs 
from Parklane because the Restatement rule only prevents relitigation if the judg-
ment that is inconsistent with the judgment relied upon was rendered prior to the 
judgment relied upon). 
128. Currie, supra note 1. 
129. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330-31 n.14. 
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mutuality should be rejected, and the Parklane Court used this example 
to make a point about how non mutual estoppel should be applied. The 
Parklane Court changed Currie's example with the result that the Court 
emphasized the potential for unfairness more strongly than had Currie 
himself. Thus, the Parklane Court's use ( or misuse) of Currie's example, 
combined with its grant to district courts of broad discretion to allow the 
use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, demonstrates that the key 
concern of the Court was how the rule should be applied, not whether 
the rule should be permitted to exist. 
Thus, although it permitted offensive collateral estoppel to exist, the 
Parklane Court took a step toward adopting Currie's approach. It did so 
by forming a rule for offensive collateral estoppel that is substantially the 
same as that of the Restatement, yet injecting into its application con-
cerns, substantially the same as Professor Currie's,130 that militate 
against the use of offensive collateral estoppel. 
The Court further limited the unbridled discretion of district judges 
in Standefer v. United States.13! In Standefer, the Court held that non-
mutual collateral estoppel is not appropriate against the government in 
criminal cases, reasoning that the rules of criminal procedure often pre-
vent the government from having "the kind of 'full and fair opportunity 
to litigate' that is a prerequisite of estoppel."132 It is significant that 
rather than repeat the requirement that courts should consider the lack 
of a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the previous action,133 the 
Court removed a whole class of cases, criminal cases, from the district 
court's discretion. 134 Such an action can only indicate distrust of such 
broad discretion in the district courts, or disapproval of how it has been 
exercised. 135 In either case, the Court was motivated by the same con-
130. See Currie, supra note 1. Professor Currie had no objection to the Bernhard deci-
sion. He agreed with it, and with the rejection of mutuality. His main purpose was 
to see that the Bernhard rule was not applied in situations in which injustice was 
likely. Id. at 284-85. 
131. 447 U.S. 10 (1980). Petitioner Standefer was indicted for aiding and abetting an 
Internal Revenue Service agent in accepting unlawful compensation. In a separate 
action the agent was acquitted. The petitioner moved to dismiss, alleging that one 
cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting when the principal has been acquitted 
and that the government should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue 
of whether the agent received unlawful compensation. [d. at 11-13. 
132. Id. at 22. Some of the procedural handicaps of the government in criminal cases 
are: 1) the government's discovery rights are limited by the Constitution and by 
rules of court; 2) the government cannot obtain a directed verdict or a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict; 3) the government cannot obtain a new trial on the 
ground that acquittal was clearly against the weight of the evidence; and 4) the 
government does not have a right of appeal. Id. 
133. The Court could very easily have followed Blonder-Tongue and held that estoppel is 
inappropriate in this case because the government lacked a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the prior case. Instead, the Court formed a new rule, noting that criminal 
cases present "considerations different from those in Blonder- Tongue and Parklane 
Hosiery." Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22. 
134. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 24-25 (rejecting the traditional case-by-case approach). 
135. Id. at 25 (noting that to permit estoppel on a case-by-case basis would permit courts 
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cerns first pointed out by Professor Currie. 136 
Standefer, however, does not provide any basis for extrapolating 
from the criminal case to civil cases.137 The Court did not interpret 
Park/ane to conclude that nonmutual estoppel in criminal cases is im-
proper. Instead the Court concluded that "this criminal case involves 
'competing policy considerations' that outweigh the economy concerns 
that undergird the estoppel doctrine,"138 a clear indication that the Court 
was not ready to make wholesale exceptions to the judges' discretion to 
apply offensive collateral estoppel in civil cases. In United States v. Men-
doza,139 however, the Court removed some private suits against the gov-
ernment from the trial judge's discretion in a way that went well beyond 
the limited exception it could have provided, indicating a willingness to 
move from the government to the nongovernment case. 
IV. EXEMPTING THE GOVERNMENT FROM OFFENSIVE 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
In United States v. Mendoza,14O the Supreme Court held that non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel is not applicable in suits against the 
United States. 141 In Mendoza, a Filipino national filed a petition for nat-
uralization under the Nationality Act, a 1942 statute designed to facili-
tate the citizenship applications of noncitizens who served honorably in 
the United States Armed Forces in World War 11.142 The plaintiff 
to "spread the effect of an erroneous acquittal to all who participated in a particular 
criminal transaction," (quoting United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3d 
Cir. 1979»). 
136. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
137. A criminal case presents different considerations than those in Blonder-Tongue and 
Parklane. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22. In addition, rules of evidence unique to crimi-
nallaw distinguish a criminal case from civil cases. [d. at 23. Finally, the impor-
tant federal interest in enforcing the criminal law is not present in private actions 
where no significant hann follows from allowing parties only one full and fair op-
portunity to litigate. [d. at 24. 
138. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 25; see also supra note 137 (discussing the different policy 
considerations). 
139. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984). 
140. [d. 
141. [d. at 574. "We hold, therefore, that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel simply 
does not apply against the government in such a way as to preclude relitigation of 
issues such as those involved in this case." One might think "issues such as those" 
means issues of law, but a footnote to this statement makes clear that this is not the 
case. [d. at n.7. Issues of constitutional law are another possibility, but the Court's 
reasoning is much broader. This article will not take a position on the meaning of 
"issues such as those." 
142. The Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), was 
amended in 1942 by the Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 77-507, § 101, 56 
Stat. 182 (1942) to make it easier for noncitizens who served in the United States 
Anned Services to become citizens. Section 701 of the Second War Powers Act 
exempted noncitizen servicemen from requirements such as residence in this coun-
try and literacy in English. Section 702 of the same Act provided for naturalization 
of servicemen who were not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to natu-
ralize aliens. Section 705 of this Act authorized the Commissioner of Immigration 
1985] Issue Preclusion 249 
claimed that although the statute had expired, the government's adminis-
tration of the statute denied him due process. 143 The district court held 
that the government was precluded from relitigating the due process is-
sue because it had litigated the same issue and lost in In re Naturalization 
of 68 Filipino War Veterans. l44 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the 
government's argument that suits against the federal government should 
be treated differently from suits against other parties. 145 The Supreme 
Court reversed this holding. 146 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, discussed four 
factors which make nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel inappropriate 
for suits against the federal government. First, the government is a party 
to a far greater number of suits than even the most litigious private en-
tity.147 Second, because of the public nature of the issues involved in 
government suits, the government is more likely than any private entity 
to litigate the same issue with different parties. 148 Third, many legal is-
sues litigated by the federal government deserve to be reviewed by several 
lower courts before review by the Supreme Court.149 And fourth, the 
government's litigation strategy, including decisions to appeal, is affected 
and Naturalization to prescribe rules to implement the Act. A complete text of this 
Act can be found in Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 207-09 (2d Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981). 
143. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 570-71 (1984). In August 1945, shortly 
after the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese, the Vice Consul of the 
United States to the Philippines was designated to naturalize aliens under the Sec-
ond War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 77-507, § IO!, 56 Stat. 182 (1942). The Philippine 
government feared that mass emigration of newly naturalized Filipinos would drain 
the country of much needed manpower and expressed this concern to the Depart-
ment of State. The United States responded by revoking the Vice Consul's authority 
under the Act and not appointing a replacement. Olegario v. United States, 629 
F.2d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981). 
144. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 570; see In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 
406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In this case, the district court dealt with a 
group of veterans who, like Mendoza, had made no effort to become naturalized 
before expiration of the Act, and concluded that the government had violated the 
due process rights of those veterans. Id. at 940-51. 
145. Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 568 
(1984). The circuit court of appeals recognized that the government often litigates 
issues of national importance where the need for a second opinion is more important 
than conservation of judicial resources, but concluded that this was not such a case. 
672 F.2d at 1329-30. 
146. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 574 (1984). 
147. Id. at 572. The Court noted that in 1982 the government was a party to more than 
75,000 of the 206,193 suits filed in federal district courts and thirty percent of the 
civil cases appealed to the courts of appeals. This distinguishes the government 
from a private litigant: the government litigates more than even the most litigious 
private party. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. The Court stated that applying estoppel "would substantially thwart the devel-
opment of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on 
a particular legal issue." This would deprive the Court of the benefit of the explora-
tion of the issue by several of the circuit courts, and may require the Court to 
change its practice of waiting for an intercircuit conflict before granting certiorari. 
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by policy considerations not present in the case of private litigants. ISO 
The Court noted that, while a private litigant generally will not forego an 
appeal if he feels he can prevail, the government may forego an appeal 
after considering such factors as limited government resources and 
crowded dockets. The Court was also concerned that the use of estoppel 
might prevent successive administrations from taking different positions 
on an issue. These differences, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, make the pol-
icies that might normally favor offensive collateral estoppel inapplicable 
in suits against the government. lSI 
The crucial aspect of the decision, for purposes of collateral estoppel 
policy, is its breadth. The Court could have limited its decision to at-
tempts to estop the government on issues of constitutional law, or on 
issues of public policy.ls2 A narrow decision would have made clear that 
the development of public policy outweighs the policies that favor collat-
eral estoppel. Such a narrow decision was reached by the Second Circuit 
in Olegario v. United States lS3 and sought by the Solictor General in 
Mendoza. 154 The inquiry thus becomes why the Court reached a broader 
decision. 
The Court explained the collateral estoppel significance of only two 
of the four factors it relied on: development of the law and considera-
tions relevant to appeal. With respect to the development of the law, the 
Court followed its reasoning in Standefer l55 and held that the develop-
ment of legal doctrine by permitting several lower courts to consider, and 
perhaps differ, on the same issue before review by the Court is more im-
portant than the policies that favor estoppel. 156 The Court could have 
stopped there, but a decision based on the type of issues, and not the type 
of defendant, would have included many cases not covered by the present 
decision. Private parties often litigate constitutional issues. If develop-
ment of the law was the sole basis for the decision, then, perhaps non-
mutual estoppel should not be permitted on any issue of law. The Court 
150. [d. at 573. 
151. [d. at 574. 
152. The Solicitor General, in his brief filed May 12, .1983, stated the issue as: "Whether 
the United States may be collaterally estopped from litigating a question of constitu-
tional law of public importance by the judgment of a district court in a prior case, 
involving different parties, in which the question was resolved adversely to the 
United States." Brief for Petitioner at (I), United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 
(1984). 
153. 629 F.2d 204, 215 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981). The Olegario 
decision is actually narrower. The Second Circuit focused on the failure of the gov-
ernment to appeal and concluded that unappealed decisions against the federal gov-
ernment on matters of public concern should not be the basis of estoppel since they 
might cause the Attorney General to appeal decisions he would not otherwise 
appeal. 
154. See supra note 152. 
155. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. As in Standefer, the Mendoza Court 
found that matters of policy made this type of case inappropriate for the case-by-
case determination of estoppel favored in Parklane. 
156. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 574. 
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dealt with this issue in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co. 157 and con-
cluded that such a rule would deny the benefits of estoppel in many in-
stances in which the development of the law would not be affected. ISS 
Thus, the Mendoza Court did not base its decision solely on the develop-
ment of the law because such a decision would have been much too 
broad. 
The Court gave two reasons for the significance of appeal considera-
tions. First, the Court explained that the policy considerations that affect 
a government decision to appeal are more important than the potential 
benefits of estoppel. 159 Second, the Court noted that allowing offensive 
collateral estoppel against the government would force the government 
to appeal every case and thus disserve judicial economy.l60 The judicial 
economy rationale appears not to be a separate rationale, but rather a 
consequence of the recognition that policy considerations may be more 
important than the benefits of collateral estoppel. Thus, the Court 
echoed Standefer by holding that certain policy considerations outweigh 
the normal estoppel considerations. The prevailing argument was spe-
cific to the government as a defendant, and the Court could have stopped 
there without substantially changing its holding. 161 Instead, the Court 
added two more reasons for not precluding the government from reliti-
157. 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) attempted to 
use private contractors to inspect one of Stauffer Chemical's plants. Stauffer refused 
to permit the inspection unless the private contractors would sign an agreement not 
to disclose trade secrets. The EPA obtained a warrant and Stauffer refused to honor 
it. The EPA started civil contempt proceedings and Stauffer moved to quash the 
administrative search warrant, arguing that private contractors are not "authorized 
representatives" under § 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.c. § 7414 (1976). 
The district court denied Stauffer's motion to quash. United States v. Stauffer 
Chern. Co., 511 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 
1982), affd, 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984). On appeal, Stauffer asserted that the EPA 
should be collaterally estopped from contending that § 114(a)(2) authorizes private 
contractors because the EPA had litigated that issue and lost in Stauffer Chern. Co. 
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981). The Sixth Circuit reversed the district 
court and adopted alternative grounds for its decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed 
with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Clean Air Act, and held that the gov-
ernment was collaterally estopped by the Tenth Circuit decision. United States v. 
Stauffer Chern. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1181-90 (6th Cir. 1982), affd, 104 S. Ct. 575 
(1984). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that mutual defensive collateral es-
toppel is appropriate against the federal government. United States v. Stauffer 
Chern. Co., 104 S. Ct. 575, 580 (1984). The Court rejected the government's argu-
ment that estoppel was improper because of the "unmixed questions of law" excep-
tion. /d. at 578; see United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924) (a question of 
law is always justiciable by the same parties in subsequent actions based on different 
demands, but not based on the same fact question or rights adjudicated previously). 
158. Stauffer Chern. Co., 104 S. Ct. at 579-80. The development of the law is not impli-
cated here because the EPA remains free to litigate this issue against other parties. 
159. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 574 (the economy interests underlying the application of 
collateral estoppel are outweighed by the constraints of resources and political ad-
ministrations peculiarly faced by the government). 
16O.Id. 
161. This reasoning was used in Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981); see supra note 153. 
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gating a,n issue: the number of cases and the nature of the issues litigated 
by the government. The use of four reasons, when two would have been 
sufficient, indicates that the Court wanted to make an additional state-
ment about offensive collateral estoppel. 
The Court gave no indication why the number of suits and therefore 
the increased potential for multiple claimants should be considered. In-
deed, because some defendants, particularly in the products liability area, 
have argued that these two factors should make offensive collateral es-
toppel inapplicable to them, it is difficult to see how these factors are 
unique to the federal government. 162 These factors make the government 
different in number, but not different in kind. An argument found in the 
Solicitor General's brief, however, clarifies the relevance of these 
factors. 163 
The Solicitor General made an argument that sounds strikingly sim-
ilar to Professor Currie's. The Solicitor General argued that the large 
number of cases litigated by the federal government makes it extremely 
likely that the government will lose some cases that involve multiple 
claimants. l64 To bind the federal government in such cases would be 
unfair because it would permit private litigants to benefit from the gov-
ernment's unique position. That is, it would be unfair to the government 
to permit a litigant to benefit from the increased odds that the govern-
ment will lose some cases that involve multiple claimants. 
The government's argument is Currie's argument. Currie was not 
concerned that courts would grant estoppel on the last twenty-four cases 
after the defendant had won the first twenty-five before one loss. He 
merely used that as an example of a clearly anomalous result. The anom-
alous result Currie feared was the hidden one. If a plaintiff is lucky 
enough to win the first case in a situation where he is likely to win only 
one or two out of fifty, courts might not give the defendant another 
chance. 165 Thus Currie's reasoning has its greatest impact on the second 
case, not the twenty-seventh. 
The Solicitor General's argument is that the government is con-
stantly trying cases in which there are more than Currie's fifty potential 
cases. This increases the chances that Currie's clearly anomalous suit will 
be the first of a series. The government argued that it should have the 
same right to show, in the second case, that something went wrong in the 
first case; the same opportunity Currie's defendant in case number 
twenty-seven has to show that something went wrong in case number 
twenty-six. 
162. See Weinberger, supra note 64, at 53 (arguing against use of offensive collateral 
estoppel in certain types of product liability suits because, inter alia, the number of 
people likely to be affected is "mind boggling"); Davis, Collateral Estoppel - An 
Awesome Specter, 34 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 73 (1983). 
163. Petition for Certiorari at 19, United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984). 
164. Id. The Solicitor General cited Parklane's citation of Currie's example of the fifty 
suits arising out of a railroad accident. 
165. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
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A defendant who foresees a large number of potential plaintiffs, such 
as the manufacturer of a widely-used product that is suspected of being 
dangerous, might argue that offensive collateral estoppel should not ap-
ply to it in light of Mendoza. The defendant should argue that the fac-
tors that justified relieving the government from the burdens of offensive 
collateral estoppel are also present in the defendant's case, therefore sug-
gesting the same result. Of course, no claim can be made that any class 
of defendants is exactly like the government and that therefore Mendoza 
should control their case. The unique position of the federal government 
in forming public policy makes that clear. Standefer and Mendoza, how-
ever, clearly demonstrate that the Court is willing to remove classes of 
cases and defendants from the usual rule of estoppel. 166 Furthermore, 
the Court's acceptance of an argument similar to Professor Currie's indi-
cates that the Court may be willing to extend similar treatment to other 
defendants in some cases. 
The defendant's argument should begin by focusing the court's at-
tention on the potential for unfairness foreseen in Parklane and the ex-
treme caution that the Parklane Court suggested judges should use in 
applying the doctrine. Then, the defendant should emphasize the gross 
injustice that would result if the first case were wrongly decided. Men-
doza recognized the possibility of an anomalous result as well as the ex-
treme unfairness of allowing an anomalous result to have a nationwide 
effect. Although the plaintiffs might argue that such reasoning would 
represent a return to the long discarded mutuality rule, the defendants 
could respond by noting the narrowness of their claim. Such a defense 
should be raised only after one previous adverse determination of the 
issue. If several courts previously held for the plaintiffs, however, it is 
unlikely that several courts will consecutively reach anomalous results, 
and therefore there is no reason to forbid the application of offensive 
collateral estoppel in the subsequent cases. Such a result complies with 
the fairness interests raised in Parklane, in Mendoza, and in Professor 
Currie's article, and still provides the recognized benefits of nonmutual 
estoppel. 
This emphasis on the second case is mandated by the Parklane, 
Mendoza, and Currie reasoning. Parklane made clear, and no subse-
quent case has questioned, that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel is 
permissible when it will not cause unfairness. After a second trial 
reaches the same result as the first, the fear that the first was anomalous, 
that is, merely the result of the increased odds that plaintiff would win 
one case, is greatly reduced. 167 Finally, because no particular type of 
166. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text. 
167. The converse is also true. In Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. 
Tex. 1980), the court correctly applied estoppel in the face of inconsistent prior 
judgments. The court reasoned that because so many courts had found that ashes-
254 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
defendant or class of defendants litigates the first case in a series with 
anything like the frequency of the federal government, no defendant or 
class of defendants can claim a Mendoza-like blanket exemption, but 
must instead argue against application of nonmutual collateral estoppel 
on a case-by-case basis. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion,168 a state court rejected the traditional requirement of mutuality for 
the application of collateral estoppel, and devised a new test providing 
that no party should have more than one full and fair opportunity to 
litigate an issue. In response to this decision, Professor Currie wrote a 
law review article famous for its hypothetical situation involving a train 
wreck. Currie noted that if fifty people are injured in this wreck, and 
each individually sues the train owner, due process requires that collat-
eral estoppel effect not be given to the first case if the defendant won that 
case. Furthermore, Currie noted that if the defendant should lose the 
twenty-sixth suit after twenty-five victories, the loss would not be given 
collateral estoppel effect in subsequent suits because the twenty-sixth case 
was clearly anomalous in light of the first twenty-five cases. Currie's con-
cern was that the anomalous result would occur in the first or second 
suit, thus causing unfairness to the defendant. 
Eventually, the Supreme Court also abandoned the mutuality re-
quirement in Blonder- Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois 
Foundation,169 a case involving the defensive use of collateral estoppel. 
Defensive collateral estoppel occurs when the defendant estops the plain-
tiff from relitigating issues the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost. 
The opposite situation, offensive collateral estoppel, occurs when the 
plaintiff estops the defendant from relitigating issues the defendant has 
previously litigated and lost. Offensive collateral estoppel was accepted 
by the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore,170 although 
the Court urged caution in applying the estoppel. The Court attempted 
to restrict the use of offensive collateral estoppel in order to avoid unfair-
ness to defendants. The concerns voiced by the Court in Parklane 
echoed those of Professor Currie in his response to Bernhard. 
Subsequently, the Court expressed further doubt about the unlim-
ited discretion it had granted to the district courts to apply offensive col-
tos is unreasonably dangerous, one case to the contrary could be disregarded. The 
important rule that seems to come from Professor Currie's reasoning is that if one 
allows a pattern to develop before granting estoppel the possibility of unfairness is 
greatly reduced. Cf Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of 
Collateral Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. REV. 612 (1978) (using probability theory to attack 
the use of nonmutual estoppel). 
168. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). 
169.402 U.S: 313 (1971). 
170. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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lateral estoppel in Park/ane. In Standefer v. United States,l71 the Court 
held that nonmutual collateral estoppel was not applicable to the govern-
ment in a criminal case. In United States v. Mendoza,l72 the Court held 
that nonmutual collateral estoppel did not apply against the government 
in a civil case. The Court relied on several factors to conclude that policy 
considerations normally favoring nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel 
are inapplicable to the government as a defendant: the number of suits 
the government defends, the public nature of the issues involved in gov-
ernment litigation, the requisite development of law for federal appellate 
review, and litigation strategies based on political administration. In 
Mendoza, the Court accepted an argument made by the Solicitor General 
that sounded very much like Professor Currie's, namely, because of the 
large number of suits on the same issue that the government is subject to 
as a defendant, the chances are greater that an anomalous result will be 
given preclusive effect. 
These considerations are of great relevance to the private defendant 
involved in multiple claimant litigation. Although it is unlikely that such 
a defendant could secure a class-like exemption similar to the one en-
joyed by the government, it is possible that with respect to the transac-
tion involved, the private defendant may successfully argue that 
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel based on the first case of a multi-
ple claimant series is improper. 
171. 447 U.S. 10 (1980). 
172. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984). 
